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INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0145

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1311

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0272

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1484

RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0732

RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1119

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1722

RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1020

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8286

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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: CD PREL SU KPKO

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. SECSTATE 65750

1B. SECSTATE 66637

1C. USUN NEW YORK 00374

11. (SBU) PolMinsCouns and Poloff delivered ref A and B points to United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant-Secretary General Hedi Annabi, DPKO Africa Division Director Dmitry Titov, DPKO Military Planning Service Chief Ian Sinclair and DPKO Office of Mission Support Senior Logistics Officer Peter McGhie on May 16.

12. (SBU) On the joint UN-African Union (AU) report on the hybrid operation for Darfur, Annabi had yet to connect with AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit to confirm the need for UN-AU agreement on the text by May 18. Annabi was firm that no concessions would be made on substance of the report, especially command and control, but that "cosmetic" changes would be possible. Annabi acknowledged that the UN would ultimately receive no credit for the hybrid, as it would be touted as an AMIS success, despite the fact that it would be UN-controlled and Commanded. Annabi noted that Djinnit was aware of this reality, whereas AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare was not. Annabi requested USG assistance in convincing the AU on this point, and Missionoffs relayed that demarcations would be conducted with the AU and some of its member countries.

13. (SBU) Once UN-AU agreement was secured, Annabi said the hybrid report would be transmitted to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and to the AU Peace and Security Council, after which "consultative briefings" would be conducted with Khartoum to inform the Government of National Unity (GNU). Annabi stressed that these would be consultations, not negotiations.

Annabi noted that this approach differed from that offered by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in a May 11 meeting with the P3 (ref C), who had reported that the report would go simultaneously to the UNSC, the AU PSC and the GNU. Annabi feared that if the GNU saw the report first, "we will negotiate forever" on its provisions, whereas securing UNSC and AU PSC agreement ahead of time would increase the report's appeal to Khartoum.

14. (SBU) On the substance of the hybrid report, Annabi and Titov were emphatic that operational control would "absolutely" come from the UN. Annabi and Titov said that the Addis Ababa coordination cell could not by definition

serve as an alternate command post and would consist of mostly UN personnel, despite its being under AU auspices. On incorporating language for a strong mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, as well as to disarm the janjaweed, Titov said that the resultant UNSC resolution should amplify these elements, which would be featured in the report though without a specific Chapter VII reference. Titov added that a UNSC stop in Khartoum during its June mission to Africa could go a long way in getting the GNU on board with any hybrid resolution under consideration at that point.

¶ 15. (SBU) Annabi reported that the UN was making decisions on Heavy Support Package (HSP) troop contributions and solicited USG assistance in shoring up additional African troop contributions for the Heavy Support Package, since the only viable offers to date were from Egypt and Nigeria. He noted there were no African engineering units or attack helicopters pledged (Sinclair interjected that Jordan had recently put a hold on its pledges of attack helicopters). Annabi pointed out that the UN could not force deployment of certain troop contributors on a host country if that country did not accept them, and he enlisted USG assistance in convincing Khartoum of the need to take non-African offers (such as Pakistan, Jordan, Thailand, Bangladesh and China - all Sudan's "friends," according to Annabi). Annabi believed that the UN now had in hand sufficient TCC pledges for HSP requirements, although they were mostly non-African.

¶ 16. (SBU) On China's pledge of an engineering unit, Titov reported that the Chinese Ministry of Defense rejected the proposal to move an existing Chinese unit from the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in order to expedite HSP deployment. Titov was not optimistic that the new Chinese unit would

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deploy by August, as the Chinese suggested, given their history of delayed deployment. On overall deployment of the three stages of AMIS assistance, Annabi was cautious in responding to USUN's push for tandem flow deployment. Annabi acknowledged that the plan was "all one process," but warned that the HSP was the backbone of what the hybrid operation would ultimately be and without a majority of HSP elements as "stepping stones" in place, hybrid success could be jeopardized from the outset.

¶ 17. (SBU) Annabi reported that \$60 million had been authorized by the ACABQ for HSP funding. McGhie confirmed that a UN officer of Somali descent was working well with the walis of the three Darfur states (citing his language skills and cultural knowledge as major factors), obviating the need for USG pressure on the GNU on issues of water surveys, permission for water use and designation of land for the HSP. McGhie said identifying water sources was not the problem in Nyala that it was in El Fasher and described plans for the "super-camp" to be constructed in South Darfur. McGhie reported that UN contracting with PA&E for construction was "moving nicely." McGhie was pleased to hear that the USG would finalize the contract for expansion of all seven camps for the AMIS plus-up within a week and that the priority camps could be ready by July/August.

¶ 18. (SBU) COL Sinclair noted that expansion of these seven camps was the "cornerstone" of AMIS sector restructuring, since the Force Commander refused to move from eight to three sectors until the two additional battalions from Nigeria and Rwanda were in place to provide force protection. Deployment of these battalions in turn was predicated on camp expansion, as well as to the provision of transport. Sinclair said that the Cairo linked its pledge of 36 APCs to the infantry troops it offered for the hybrid and that the GOE was not willing to lease these APCs to other battalions besides its own, effectively taking the Egyptian offer off the table. Titov gave no specific indication of how much of the Egyptian pledges DPKO would be able to accept, saying only it would not be the whole package. Sinclair appealed to the USG for

assistance in this regard, saying that ideally the Nigerian and Rwandan battalions should come equipped with their own APCs and corresponding equipment or should appeal to donors to supply them.

¶9. (SBU) Finally, on the issue of appointments, Annabi said the UN was trying to persuade Konare to de-link the announcement of Force Commander (FC) with the announcement of Deputy FC, on which the Rwandan candidate was not yet confirmed. Annabi reported that FC GEN Agwai would be in New York and in Washington for consultations on May 17-18 and would hopefully arrive in Sudan before the UNSC Mission arrived in mid-June. Annabi assured that Agwai would have a coterie of "trusted" UN advisors. Titov reported that there was no UN movement yet on appointment of a Special Representative for UNMIS, adding that "you (the USG) probably know more about it than we do."

¶10. (SBU) USUN inquired about the status of the UN mission to Chad, and Annabi reported that a delegation consisting of police and military planners, humanitarian representatives, logistics and political officer would depart for N'djamena May 22 and remain for at least 30 days. Titov noted, however, that the team would have no power of negotiation but would only explain the concept and modalities of UN peacekeeping for eastern Chad.

KHALILZAD